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IN TEE SOPREME COORT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAVID M. S'I'ACFFER and CONNIE A. 
S7AUFFER, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
and Cross Respondents, 
RUSSELL CALL and VELMA CALL and 
SUNSET CANYON CORPORATION, 
Defendants and Respondents 
and Cross Appellants. 
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
BRIEF FOR PETITION 
ON REHEARING 
Case No. 15468 
Appellants filed their complaint seeking specific per-
furrnance of a Uniform Real Estate Contract. Alleging respondents' 
and petitioners' maliciousness in refusing to execute deeds pur-
ruant to that contract and irreconcilable differences between the 
parties, appellants a 1 so sought an egui table partition of properties 
~tween the parties. Prior to trial, appellants also sought, in 
the alternative, compensation for improvements made on portions of 
the property. This c 1 aim was 1 a ter withdrawn. 
Respondents answered, denying any malice or ill-intent 
toward the plaintiffs, and affirmatively alleging that they had 
diligently attefl'lpted to complete the negotiations contemplated by 
the contract. Respondents further asserted that the contract, as 
written~ as contemplated by the parties, violated the Statute 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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of Frauds, and that parol evidence was not competent t 0 cure. 
defect. Lastly, respondents counterclaimed for rnesne r 
ents :· 
those general areas to which access had been sp a· ora ically der 
them by appellants. 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Appellants filed their action in March of 1973. !?. 
By August, 1973, six depositions had been taken, includingo~; 
from each of the four parties to the initial contract. (R. 2;: 
et.seq.-295) 
In April, 1976, respondents, petitioners herein, mc. 
for a partial summary judgment. ( R. 75) This matter was cal:e:1 
for hearing on April 15, 1976; the depositions were publishec, 
the testimony of the appellants' surveyor was taken. T~t~ 
script appears in the record as the Reporter's Transcript, is 
twenty-three pages long, and ends as follows: 
THE COURT: Alright, thank you, gentlemen, 
and the matter is submitted, subiect only to your 
filing memoranca and the Court will rule on it. 
MR. BISHOP: Thank you. 
MR. HUGHES: Thank you. (R.296 at 22) 
Subsequently, memoranda, as requested, were submit'.::! 
the respective parties, with appellants filing affidavits in 
opposition to the motion. (R.77-98; 107-141; and 162-183) '.:' 
, I 
early October, 1976, Judge Burns overruled and denied responc; 
motion for summary judgment, setting the matter for pretrial:: 
November 11, 1976. (R.185-186;190) 
The case was subsequently tried to the cou!_!: on May 
eleventh and twelfth, 1977. The dis~rict 
. 1 tr' judge viewed al 
-2- d 
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exhibits ar:d observed the demeanor and judged the credibility of 
witnesses. ~espite sixty-three objections to the introduction of 
testimony, the :::::ourt took evidence and heard everythina the parties 
said and did proferred by plaintiffs-appellants to prove their 
contract. (See Appendix) 'I'hough respondents objected nine times 
w several areas of examination on the basis of the parol evidence 
rule or the Statute of Frauds, each time respondents' objections 
were overru 1 ed. (Id.) The only testimony not received was that 
proferred to show improvements, this due to the fact that plaintiffs-
appellants had withdrawn their claim for compensation for improve-
~nts and they conceded that the improvements were not offered to 
~ow or delineate the so-called boundaries of the parcels allegedly 
purchased. ( T. 12 2: 15-12 3: 7) Furthermore, many of the improvements 
concededly were made after the lawsuit had been filed. So exhaus-
tive was the trial court's inquiry that midway through trial, on 
recross by respondents' -petitioners' counsel, Mr. Bishop, counsel 
for plaintiffs-appellants, objected to further testimony on one 
alleged boundary as cumulative, indicating: 
MR. BISHOP: Objection, your Honor, that is 
we have been over this four or five times. (T. 162:4-5) 
Ultimately, the trial transcript comprises 294 pages. 
After plenary trial, the district judge exercised his exclusive 
province.!/ to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and found 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract unenforceable. Specifically, the 
hial court noted that the document presented to the court failed 
t 2/ 0 describe with particularity any tract of land.- The parol 
~stimony of the parties was contradictory, and the exhibits 
-3-
bz 
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preferred and received by the court did nothing to clarify t:.' 
ambiguity. Plaintiffs'-appellants' main exhibit, Exhibit 
2 
'' 
shows that there are no walls and wire fences or 
an Y boundar:' 
around the two homes which enclose any acreage. A ppe 11 ants F 
asserted that one parcel, bounded only on two sides by a fenc, 
and designated by them as containing 18. 3 acres, was the fort·: 
-parcel to be retained by respondents-petitioners pursuant to~· 
document drafted January 2, 1969. Further, plaintiffs'-appe:: 
proposed boundaries for the home parcels rarely followed fenc' 
walls at all, al though a few straight and sporadically intern: 
fences are depicted nearby. Lastly, a large fence, locatedc~ 
southern portion of the exhibit was not even located 00 t~ 
property in question! 
The trial court also found that all the parties exec, 
the January 2nd document with the expectation that boundaries 
would be agreed upon, and that appellants moved onto the pror 
knowing these matters were unsettled. The court further founc 
that the respondents made several trips to Utah to settle the 
boundaries, but that there had never been a meeting of the mk 
of the parties as to the nature or extent of the boundaries' 
location.l/ 
Lastly, the court noted that appellants had volur.tar 
withdrawn that portion of the complaint alleging respondents 
f " accord:· "unlawful, wrongful, and malicious refusal to per orm 
4 I t held, i to the written document.- All the parties, the cour 
5 I h trial cc 
come be fore the court in good faith. - And, while t e 
, poracic found that respondents had knowledge of appellants 5 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cccupation of the premises, it did not find respondents had con-
sented to the same. There is ample evidence in the record to 
support that distinction. 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to Rule 75, URCP, appellants designated the 
Record on Appeal on October 2 4, 19 77. (R.287) Simultaneously, 
they filed their certificate that a transcript had been ordered. 
(R.288) The district court clerk then transmitted to the Supreme 
court the following nine volumes: Two volumes of court records, 
all six depositions taken prior to the overruled riotion for sum-
mary judgment, and the Reporter's Transcript of the summary 
~udgment proceedings. These were all filed in the Clerk's Office 
in Salt Lake City on November 22, 1977. 
In December, 1977, Willard R. Bishop, Esq., counsel for 
appellants, checked out these nine volumes and had them trans-
mitted to Cedar City, Utah, sor.ie 280 miles from the Court. 
Subsequent thereto, two more volumes were filed in Salt Lake City 
as supplemental to the record on appeal: (1) An Order executed by 
Judge Burns extending the time for filing the transcript of trial, 
docketed on December 19, 1977; and (2) The transcript of trial, 
docketed January 27, 1978. 
Mr. Christiansen, Judge Burns' court reporter, provided 
both counsel with copies of that trial transcript, so neither 
counsel checked it out from the Supreme Court Clerk. By pre-
arrangement between counsel, the nine volumes were transferred 
horn Cedar City to st. George for use incident to the preparation 
of respondents' brief. Subsequently, by stipulation, the exhibits 
br -5-
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were forwarded to the Supreme Court. The nine vol UMes compr: 
the original record on appeal were not returned until J 1 u y, :: 
This case was set fer argument on October 10, 1971 . 
Justice Ellett, subsequent thereto, checked out only nine of· 
eleven volumes of the designated record on appeal. A pparentl; 
the last two volumes were never removed from the Clerk's Offk 
The Supreme Court Opinion was filed on January 9
1 
:i· 
Pursuant to Rules 76(e) and (f) of URCP, petitioners' counsel, 
the basis of concurrent obligations, received an extension tc ·' 
this brief on or before February 13, 1979. 
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL 
The Supreme Court, apparently due to the inadvertent 
shevelment of the designated record on appeal, seemingly viewe:I 
cc:i.se without the benefit of the supplemental record, includinc1 
. 1 . 6/ tria transcript.- The first paragraph of the Opinion, sirnL 
others therein, confuses the parties and states that appellant' 
respondents, were to retain approximately forty acres of farni" 
Furthermore, the payments recited as made in that paragraph al' 
incorrect. These misstatements, however, are probably insign;', 
0 f more significance is the body of the Opinion whic: 
never clearly delineates the standards of review applicable tc 
judgments after trial. Noting the on-going disagreement of& 
t" parties, the Opinion only briefly alludes to the trial cour · 
of the having taken parol evidence with regard to the language 
. . d t of the 
contract and the subsequent communication and con uc 
parties. 
. . . 1 t1'ce of an Thereafter, the Opinion takes JUd1c1a no 
h state or 
increase of land values in the southern region of t e 
-6-
• 
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hypothesize that respondents could stand idly by, bargaining in to 
bad faith and hoping for a "mighty windfall." The Opinion fails 
to note that the trial court explicitly rejected that hypothesis 
-F. d. 7 I 
and made a contrary _in ing. -
Having once fixed the position of the parties within this 
12Ypothesis, the Opinion then proposes a theory of recovery, part 
performance, that was never pled, ~ tried by consent, and 
~raised on appeal. Part performance, the Opinion reasoned, 
takes "the matter" out of the Statute of Frauds, and is dispositive 
of the case. 
Ultimately, the thrust of the reversal assumes the 
existence of sufficient fences and stone walls never shown at 
trial by which the descriptive boundaries are to be located and 
instructs the trial court to al low appellants their day in court 
and take the testimony of what was said and done - something the 
ttial court had already exhaustively accomplished. Thereafter, 
the Opinion instructs the trier of fact to decide the legal 
~~ription of the land purchased and order the same conveyed to 
appellants - this, despite the trial court's express finding that 
~ough the parties all contemplated an agreement on the boundaries, 
"no subsequent agreement, oral or otherwise, was ever reached that 
resolved the ambiguities. 11 .!!/ 
It clearly appears that Justice Ellett felt that the 
trial court had ruled on the basis of the summary judgment tran-
script and the other volumes of the record he viewed. The Opinion's 
~rnana, according to one recent decision, in fact postures the 
parties as if there had never been a trial .J..I 
-7-
.. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING 
Petitioners, on rehearing, request that the Suprene 
Court re-examine the entire designated record on appeal. ~t 
tioners request that the Supreme Court scrutinize the ~~~~ 
nature and thrust of the judicial notice taken, and the prop::. 
of taking the same without notice to petitioners. Petitioner: 
request that the Supreme Court re-examine the standard of rer: 
mistakenly applied to evaluate this case. Petitioners reque~: 
that the Supreme Court evaluate the doctrine of part ~rfum~ 
which, as a prerequisite to its invocation, requires a comple: 
contract and meeting of the minds, in light of the trial cour: 
findings that no such event ever took place. Petitioners rec:' 
the Supreme Court to review its position as advocate in not c:. 
proposing ~ sponte part performance as a theory of recovery, 
but, without notice or any argument thereon, finding it dispc: 
tive of the case. Petitioners request that the Supreme Coort 
examine the logic of an opinion which hypothesizes the potent:: 
for bad faith, and then rules as if the case before it fit tt,1 
hypothesis. Lastly, petitioners request that the SupremeCou:: 
examine the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits which 
clearly display the paucity of fences, walls, or other natura: 
boundaries to demarcate the alleged boundaries of appellants' 
purchases. 
Ultimately, petitioners seek reversal of the Opinic: 
which apparently allows the district judge to ~ for the 
· · 1 f d non-exi· stent, and then parties a contract, previous y oun 
10/ judicially enforce that contract as created.~ 
-8-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
rt is perhaps repetitious to state facts supplemental to 
those found and entered by the trial court in petitioners' favor. 
Nonetheless, an overview of the facts may effectively serve to 
hlghlight the testimony forming the basis for the lower court's 
findings, insofar as the Opinion seemingly ignores them. 
In 1959 the petitioners, Russell and Velma Call, pur-
chased approximately 400 acres of property in Washington County in 
an area generaly known as Anderson Junction. The farm they 
~~based was bisected by old U.S. Highway 91 and on each side of 
the highway was located one house, the larger to the east con-
structed of rock, and the smaller to the west constructed of 
~ick. The surrounding area has an occasional rock wall and some 
sporadic fences. As indicated by Exhibits D-·2 and D-3, much of 
the land had been used for farming, with some having been set 
aside for orchards.DI Irrigation water for all the land was 
supplied primarily from a single well. 
Though this purchase was consummated in 1959, the Calls 
never moved to the 1 and, nor have they ever 1 i ved on it. 
In 1968 the plaintiffs-appellants visited the Anderson 
Junction area while vacationing in Utah. Basically they obtained 
nothing more than an idea of the general lay of the land. Mr. 
Stauffer came once again at Christl!las of 1968, but again only got 
a general idea of the lay of the land. fT.20:11-14) On his last 
trip, however, Mr. Stauff~r, a real estate agent with an inactive 
license, obtained some blank Uniform Real Estate Contracts ante-
cederit to a meeting with the Cal ls at the latter's residence on 
-9-.. 
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January 2, 1969, in Santa Maria, California, aporoxfoat 1 • · e y ]1j1 
miles from the subject property. (T.17:6-12; 75:29-76:1!; ll. 
23:4) 
On January 2, 1969, the parties basically sat aroun' 
1 arge table with Mr. Stauffer and Mr. Ca 11 the primary partic 
pants in the preparation of the document executed that d~. 
(T.64:14-69; 139:11-14; 140:24-141:15; 232:20-21) 
The completed contract appears as plaintiffs' Exhik 
17. The conveyancing clause of the contract states as follo•.: 
Witnesseth: that the seller for the consideration hereb 
mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, and tf.e 
buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to 
purchase the following described real property, situate 
in the County of Washington, State of Utah, to-wit: 
Andersons' Junction, more particulary described as folio« 
see enclosed legal description.* Stauffers to purchase 
two houses using the natural boundaries which is approxi· 
mately ten ( 10) acres collectively plus approximately l/' 
water rights. Calls to retain the fenced natural farm 
ground on the SE South side from interstate freeway 
(which is approximately forty acres) plus 2/5 water righ: 
The remaining ground SE of the old highway to be STAUFFEL 
along with the two houses. STAUFFERS to purchase 1/2 of 
all remaining property to be owned as tenants in ~~M 
with CALLS. 
The above description was based on an initial assuif) 
that U.S. Highway 91 ran east and west, insofar as itwentfr: 
California to Utah. (":'.236:6-14) All of the parties thattes: 
fied, particularly Mr. Stauffer, the real estate agent, undeii'.' 
that the boundaries of the parcels to be purchased by the stac' 
* Attached to the Uniform Real Estate Contract is a ~wo page 
document entitled "Legal Description" setting ~orth eight the: 
specifically described and surveyable parcel or land, todescr: 
with water rights. At trial, plaintiffs conceded these b~tc: 
tions did net define the property they were purchasi~, 
the sum total of all the Calls' property. (T.65:7-14) 
-10-
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were undetermined, important, and subject to future negotiation. 
(T. 6S:7-14; 80:30-81:23; 82:27-29) The use of infinitives within 
the document, ~, STAUFFERS to purchase and Calls to sell and 
convev and to retain, further evinces the precatory intent of the 
-~ 
~rties. Mrs. Stauffer also clearly understood and testified at 
trial that the boundaries of the parcels to be purchased were 
still subject to negotiation. In reference to the January 2 
meeting, she stated as follows: 
we agreed to agree, because we were trying to get along. 
( T . 1 7 0 : 14 -15 ; see al so T . 1 7 0 : 1- 3 0 ) 
On January 2, the Calls also understood that they would 
have to come to Utah and meet with the Stauffers to work out the 
boundaries. (T.244:15-22; 266:10; see also Finding of Fact No. 5) 
Inwfar as Mr. Stauffer was presently teaching school rather than 
elling real estate, the parties tentatively agreed to meet during 
Easter of 1969 to work out the boundaries. (T.66:30; 244:8-26; 
and 266: 17-21) It cannot be gainsaid that as the boundaries of 
t~ property circumscribing the homes and the 40 acres to be 
retained in fee by the Cal 1 s remained uncertain, the balance of 
the property description implicitly remained egually nebulous. 
On February 12, 1969, appellants wrote the Calls 
indicating only that they were planning on visiting Anderson 
Junction to go into the homes and do "a lot of looking around". 
ID-13) At the trial, Mr. Stauffer testified that by D-13 he 
notified Mr. Cal 1 of the Stauffers' plans on moving furniture 
ar.d starti;-,g renovation of the homo=s, preparatory to his wife's 
occupation of the same. (T.85:2-14) The letter also reguested 
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that the Calls execute a notice attached thereto indic t' 
a ing ~· 
a sale had been consummated. Mr. Cal 1 never signed that noti: 
Though Mr. Call did not expect the Stauffers ~~~ 
onto the property until the boundaries were settled, he disco,• 
during Easter of 1969 that Mrs. Stauffer had already taken po; 
sion of the small home. (T.266:4-14; T.39:19) Attempted neg:· 
tiations to determine the boundaries at this time were fruitle 
and Mr. Call returned to California, as did Mr. Stauffer to f:·J 
teaching school. At trial, though it was stipulated that Sta:', 
made several improvements on the land, their attorney also~ 
that the improvements did nothing to aid in the determinatior,. 
boundaries. (T.122:15-123:33; see also T.190:9-192:20) The 
subsequent possession by Mrs. Stauffer was sporadic, bo~ ~t 
terms of time and in area occupied. An early affidavit of~ 
Stauffer indicated that from August 1971 to January 1973 she 
resided in California with her husband. (R.24,'][4) At triaP: 
Stauffer testified similarly. (T.217:28-218:3) On the dayo: 
trial, in 1977, Mr. Stauffer still resided in California ands~ 
taught school there. (T.16:26-28) 
Pursuant to the document executed on January 2, IW 
payments were tendered and received through September of !97l. 
(T.41:6-14) To negotiate the boundaries, Mr. Call came toAni' 
f om wor'' 
son Junction six times, spending twenty-one days away r 
1969 alone. Mr. Stauffer testified on cross that Russell call 
came up to the property two to three times a year, mainly to 
settle the boundaries. (T.245:17-20; 85:28-87:6) At trial O 
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~stified that all of the money he had received had been expended 
in making such trips. (T.266:25-28) 
Though negotiations continued, no agreement was reached 
on the boundaries in 1969, or in later years. (T.250:15-20; 
T.250: 23-29; and 252: 2-11) The trial court specifically found 
that al though discussions tock place, no agreement was ever 
12/ 
reached.-
Sometime in late 1972 or early 1973, Mrs. Stauffer 
re~rned to Anderson Junction. Despite the fact that the contract 
purportedly transferred only approximately l/5th of the Junction's 
water rights, she filed documents with the State Engineer's 
office claiming all of the water. (T.150-151) With her hands 
already soiled by this deception, Mrs. Stauffer subsequently con-
tacted an attorney who forwarded several deeds to the Calls, 
requesting their execution of the same. (See Exhibit C attached 
~Complaint at R.17) Mr. Call took these deeds to a civil 
engineer and, upon seeing what they described, refused to execute 
them. Thereafter a survey map "commissioned by and prepared for 
the Stauffers" was mailed to the Calls, with a second demand that 
the Calls execute deeds upon the threat of litigation. (R.17-18) 
At trial Mrs. Stauffer testified that her survey as 
~atted followed little piles of rocks placed on the property in 
1972 by her and Mr. Cal 1 in an excursion over two hours long. 
(T.106:21-ll.Z..!.l; 132:12-13; 133:2-134:3) Unable to explain 
th . 
e inconsistency between this story and her prior statements 
under oath, on cress examination, she admitted that some of the 
boundaries were set arbitrarily by her surveyor. (T.112:7-9; 
-13-
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135:22-136:5; and 158:19-27) Mr. Gale Day, ~ 
surveyor, was never called at trial to corroborate h 
er story 
Conversly, Mr. Call categorically and emphatically d . 
en1ed sue· 
field trip. ( T. 252: 20-27; 252: 28-253: 5; and 253: 30-2S4:G) '. 
trial court specifically rejected Mrs. Stauffer's story When: 
found that no agreement was ever reached resolving the ambig~. 
land descriptions. Finding No. 7. 
The principal problem with the Stauffer survey is t 
it unilaterally supplies descriptions neither amicably settk 
contained in the Uniform Real Estate Contract of 1969, in vio 
of the parol evidence rule.11/ Furthermore, as platted, the 
survey expresses little more than the Stauffers' self-interest 
and a very real proclivity of Mrs. Stauffer for overreaching. 
but one example, both Stauffers maintained throughout trial t: 
the 40 acres of farmland to be retained by Calls consisted o'. 
parcel platted by their surveyor as containing only 18.30 am 
(T.83:19-23; 98:11-16; see D-2*) 
Examination of the Stauffer survey reflects the part 
discovery during Easter of 1969 that there are no fences or na:• 
boundaries which effectively enclose any area as designated irt 
document of January 2 , 19 6 9 . Further, whi 1 e the Opinion indic:· 
that natural boundaries consisted of stone walls and wire fen: 
examination of this survey, coupled with the Stauffers' testir 
reveals that few of the boundaries on the parcels as platted 
followed any such demarcation. 
for,,: Around the smal 1 house, · 
~1·' 
* Note that D-2 and P-18 both depict the Stauffer surveY, 1:: 
for different markings put on them during the course of tr'· 
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t One of the boundaries of parcel 1 follows a fence or wall 00 • 
A ;iarcel adJacent to the small house (parcel 2) has only c·ne 
~undary co-extensive with a fence or wall, and in that instance 
fails to follow the same when such wall curved to the sout!'least. 
Mr. Stauffer recognized these problems and further clarified +:hat 
~ny parts of the boundaries had never been discussed. (T.73:9-
28 I 
The land around the large house (parcel 3, as designated 
~the Stauffers) was also arbitrarily designated. While one of 
its boundaries follows a fence, the other three were arbitrarily 
located by the surveyor. (T.82:4-15) A lengthy fence shown to 
the south of both D-2 and P-18 was located on property owned by 
Owen Cottam. 
At trial Mrs. Stauffer was cros3 examined relative to P-
94, an illustration she prepared representing her pictorial 
understanding of the boundaries in 1971. The differences between 
~r drawing and the survey prepared for her by Gale Day in 1972 
are striking by comparision. (See P-24; and T.172:22-176:21) 
While Parcel No. 4 as reflected on D-2 and P-18 is not 
~unded entirely by fences, those exhibits fail to show another 
~nee to the north and east of that parcel, which is depicted on 
a survey prepared for the petitioners by Marion Malnar, a licensed 
~rveyor. (D-3) All of the parties were aware of this fence, and 
t~ appellants knew that the property within the same had been 
~rmed, perhaps even by Peter Anderson, the original owner. 
IT· 9 2: 18- 2 8 ; 9 3- 9 5 ; 9 7 : 6 ; 9 8 : 2 9-9 9 : 7; 13 3 : 2 6-13 4 : 6; and 16 7 : 19-3 0 ) 
?hcugh the outer fence took in some B.L.M. ground, the appellants 
-15-
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..., 
could never accept Calls' position that it was this fence th· 
··< 
enclosed the 40 acres of farmland he wished to retain. 
No ta( 
using a ridge to the east of old U. S. Highway 91 as one boun:. 
the same having been used by appellants in their designat· 
ion: 
parcel 4, the area designated by Cal 1, less approximately 5 ai 
would have comprised approximately 42.93 acres. 
The survey prepared by Mr. Mal nor, nonetheless, is. 
as objectionable as the survey prepared by Gale Day. As draf: 
it reflects nothing more than a surveyor's interpretation of: 
possible description under the terms of the contract. At trL 
petitioners preferred that Marien Malnor would testify that;, 
familiar with the land, it was, nonetheless, impossible forh:·
1 
survey anything on the basis of P-17, the Uni form Real Estate 
Contract dated January 2, 1969. It was further preferred that 
Malnar would testify that both surveyors' descriptions were 
possibilities under the document and neither could be said to: 
more accurate than the other. Understanding the thrust ofili 
testimony, appellants waived their right of cross examination 
the proffer was accepted. (T.276:30-278:2) 
As neither party would accept the other's designatic:1 
boundaries, litigation ensued. During the litigation Mr. and': 
Call, who could ill-afford the travel and expense, guit-clai~e: 
h. c1 
whatever interest they had to Sunset Canyon Corporation, WI· 
solely owned by Dexter Snow of St. George. Sunset Canyon Cor;:· 
to Whatever 1. nterest the plaint:I tion took the property subject 
had purchased and not in derogation of their title. ( T. 267:11· 
after t he first pretri; Negotiations continued, but broke down 
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197:: . Triai tooK place on May 11 and 12, 1977. The testimony 
•erred therein or.ly accentuated the ambiguity of the January 2, pro. · 
1969 , document and !71ade patently obvious the disagreement between 
the parties. This, the court so found. 
BASIS FOR PETITION 
POINT I 
THE OPINION VIOLATES RULE 12 OF THE UTAH RUL~S 
OF EVIDENCE AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 7, OF ':'HE 
CONS':'ITUTION OF UTAH IN TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE 
OF A MATTER NOT THERETOFORE SO NOTICED IN THE 
ACTION WITHOUT AFFORDING TEE RESPONDENTS A 
REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT INFORMATION 
RELEVANT TO THE PROPRIETY OF TAKING SUCH JUDI-
CIAL NOTICE AND TO THE TENOR OF THE MATTER SO 
NOTICED. 
A. The Due Process Safeguards 
The Utah Rules of Evidence were adopted by the Supreme 
Court to be effective July 1, 1971, pursuant to the rule-making 
power entrusted to the Court by Section 78-2-4 of the Otah Code. 
~le 12(4) of those Rules specifically refers to those standards 
of due process afforded all parties prior to a reviewing court's 
taking judicial notice. In particular, that Rule states as 
follows: 
A judge or reviewing court taking judicial notice under 
paragraph (1) or (3) of this rule of matter not theretofore 
so noticed in the action shall afford the parties reasonable 
opportunity to present information relevant to the propriety 
of taking such judicial notice and to the tenor of the matter 
to be noticed. (Id., emphasis added) 
The salutary purpose of the above Rule becomes clearly 
evident from this case. Embodying those standards of due process 
of Liw affordable to litigants under Article I, Section 7 of the 
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Utah Constitution, the Rule essentially precludes appella~ 
advocacy affecting vested rights without the opportunity for 
interested parties to be adequately heard. 
In the instant case, the Opinion's autho r, sans any 
hearing, took judicial notice as follows: 
This Co':1rt takes ju~icial knowledge of the fact tha: 
land values in the area increased greatly since the cont•• 
was made. By refusing to agree on the exact description': 
t~e land sold and in which plaintif~s were placed in pos;. 
sion, the seller could hope for a mighty windfall ~~I 
it at its enchanced value to others. · 
The phrase in Rule 12, "the tenor of the matter to be noticec' 
particularly applicable to the above paragraph of the Court's 
Opinion. Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabrida• 
Edition, (1976) defines "tenor" as follows:l.!/ 
( 1) General course or strain; general direction; mode or 
continuance; (2) general character or nature; (3) that 
course of thought which holds on or runs through the who:: 
a discourse; general course; drift or direction of thougn·. 
purport; sustance. 
In the above instance, the notice taken serves only: 
introduce a tainted theoretical situation, Justice Ellett,~ 
sponte postulating petitioners' possible refusal to bargain ii 
good faith. Beyond re-posturing the previously innocuous equ:· 
table position of the parties, the Opinion's judicial notice 
surprisingly assumed a hypothetical situation contrary to an 
express finding of the trial court, which states: 
The Court finds that there was a justifiable dispute ads t'.. 
t re ma e' the existence of the boundaries, that payr.ien s we d de'r 
kept under the contract, and that both plaint~ffs a~ fai;'. 
ants asserted their claims before this court in goo 
(Finding No. 13, R.261) 
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B. '1.'he Thrust of Actual Bad Faith or Fraud 
In State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600 (1951), 
an opinion drafted by Justice Crockett held that the value of per-
sonalty about which no evidence had been proferred could not be 
•udicially assumed in reaching a legal conclusion. Nonetheless, 
in Flick v. VanTassell, 547 P.2d 204 (Utah 1976), this Court indi-
cated it might, on rare occasions, examine things outside the 
record if an obvious injustice or fraud would ot:herwise occur. 
See also Paetross v. Board of Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 
1976) • 
The applicability of actual bad faith to real estate 
contracts otherwise uncertain has long been recognized by the Utah 
Supreme Court. In Adams v. Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P. 465 (1915) 
the Supreme Court in the body of its discussion quoted Roberts on 
Frauds, §135, as follows: 
To call anything a part performance, before the existence of 
the thing (the contract) whereof it is said to be part 
performance is established, is an anticipation of proof by 
assumption, and gets rid of the statute by jumping over it, 
for the statute requires proof and prescribes the medium of 
proof. 
Thereafter, however, the Adams Court intimates that the foregoing 
statement of law may not be hard and fast under peculiar circum-
stances. 146 P. at 466. Further, that the Statute of Frauds will 
not be employed to shield a fraud is an oft-quoted maxim in the 
law. Courts unerringly, however, fail to postulate whether bad 
~1 th would breathe certainty into a description otherwise uncer-
tain, or rather simply give rise to an action at law for damages. 
Regardless, while factual circumstances of bad faith might excuse 
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some extrajudicial 
speculation on bad 
the litigants, has 
examination with notice to the part· . ies, JU'.. 
faith or possible fraud, even when 1· .. nvitec · 
been sagaciously rejected by this Court. 
Pioneer Finance & Thrift Co. v. Powell, 21 Utah 2d 201, 443 P 
389 (1968). 
C. The Indefensible Use of "What If" In the Decision-
Makina Process 
As indicated by Justice Wilkins in dissent, "[t]he 
suggestion in the majority opinion that the sellers refused t: 
agree in bad faith and in hope of windfall profit is simply,~. 
justified by the evidence. " Further, that suggest ion is expre; 
contrary to the trial court's finding, which is amply supporte: 
the record. Such judicial notice as taken here seemingly ser:: 
but one purpose and that is to place the parties before the Cc: 
in a hypothetical situation as if bad faith had occurred and t'.' 
to rule by so positioning the parties. E. Wayne Thode, pro:e:' 
of law, has indicated that the use of a hypothetical case to 
d · · f · · d f ·bl lS/ ~h th t f Prr'1 eterrnine cause in act is in e ensi e.- ·1· e rus O- ,, 
Thode' s criticisms in the area of tort law is no less applica:: 
here; judicial inquiry is not illuminated by postulating what 
might have happened under other circumstances and then rul~ 
as if those circumstances had occurred. 
It should be further noted that the Opinion, while 
taking judicial notice of present land values, fails to take 
notice of what those values were in 1969. It is equally plaus: 
that Mr. Stauffer, havi.ng recently been to Utah prior to Janua: 
2, 1969, and having held a real estate license, had peculiar 
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k owledge enabling him to construct a bargain unconscionably .n 
~vorable to himself. The comparison of land values, however, 
never came up at trial because the issue of bad faith was never 
appropriately presented to the court, the facts clearly showing 
that petitioners came to the court with clean hands and in good 
faith. See Finding No. 13, R.261. 
D. The Duty of the Appellate Tribunal 
The Opinion's taking of judicial notice without affording 
the petitioners an opportunity to be heard cannot be passed off as 
harmless error. The thrust of that notice colors the entire 
Opinion; to reach the same result, but delete the offensive para-
graph on rehearing, would do both this Court and the parties liti-
gant a gross injustice. Justice Benjamin Cardozo, speaking for 
the Supreme Court of the United States, and construing provisior,s 
similar to the due process clauses of the Utah Constitution, 
indicated that the necessity of a hearing prior to an appellate 
court's taking judicial notice is one of the "rudiments of fair 
play assured to every litigant." Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public 
Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292 at 304-305 (1937). Ohio Bell 
subsequently formed the basis of the advisory comments applicable 
to Rule 20l(e) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which closely 
parallels Rule 12(4) U.R.E. applicable in this jurisdiction. 
Again, the pejorative nature of the judicial notice 
taken on appeal cannot be ignored. The indication that the sellers 
~~_liy~J:~in3~~.£ a windfall assumes an underlying scheme 
directly contrary to the record and the express findings entered 
by the trial court. A careful reading of the Opinion reveals that 
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to its advocate-author, the hypothetical case became th ~ 
a. Pos:: 
in which the parties were fixed and affected the ultirnat .. 
· e ais;: 
tion of the case. No notice regarding the nature and ten . 
or O'. 
those matters judicially noted was ever tendered to peti·t1· oner, 
their counsel. 
In summation, the Utah Constitution and accomp~~M 
code charge the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, 
with administering, and creating where necessary, a vast body, 
substantive and procedural law by which it creates a tradition 
justice in the State of Utah. The Utah Rules of Evidence adoft 
in 1971 prescribe a system of evidentiary rules by which~ 
standards were afforded parties litigant to avoid surprise anc 
injustice. Most of these rules prescribe the standards~~~ 
the courts control its officers in their efforts to afford the:: 
clients a day in court and empower the judiciary to limit, !arr' 
based on a long and developing tradition of common law, the in~ 
duction of evidence that might be false, unsubstantiated, withe 
foundation or only marginally relevant. A few, among them Ru!: 
12, exemplify those very notions of "notice" and "an opportuni'. 
to be heard" by which the very meaning of justice is both manci: 
and measured. Should the Utah Supreme Court, at this juncture, 
there fore, choose to ignore or otherwise bypass the thrust oft 
Rule, then the essence of the same, though embraced with words, 
will be emaciated by action. Sil!lply stated, the Opinion's juci· 
notice, and the tenor or fair import to be derived thereof, un· 
amb].. ent in whic: fairly characterized l!lY clients and created an 
d Wh ,,,n in fact t'.' the Opinion ruled as if something had occurre -
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trial court found it had not. As an officer of the Court, I ask 
~r a rehearing of this entire case, or, in the alternative, an 
opportunity to be heard, pursuant to Rule 12, pertaining to the 
nature and tenor of the judicial notice which colored this Opinion. 
POINT II 
THE SUPREME COURT APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD 
OF REVIEW TO THIS CASE ON APPEAL DUE TO THE 
INADVERTANT DISHEVELMENT OF' THE DESIGNATED 
RECORD ON APPEAL. 
As stated earlier in this brief, two volumes of the 
designated record on appeal were never removed from the Clerk's 
office. One of those two volumes was most likely the trial tran-
£ript supplementally filed in January of 1978. The Court's 
discussion of the evidence below can be extracted largely by 
refurence to the briefs and the other nine volumes initially filed 
with the Court. The Opinion's thrust, however, was to afford the 
~~llants their day in court, something that had already occurred. 
It is inconsistent that Justice Ellett would knowingly only par-
tially review the record; and procedurally he would not require 
a case to be re-opened had he known all the evidence was in. 
A further comparison of the standards of appellate review will 
reveal that Justice Ellett inadvertently felt that on the record 
before him, this case had been submitted after summary judgment. 
A. Appeals After Plenary Trial 
First, petitioners recognize that in equity, pursu~nt to 
Article VIII, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution, the Supreme 
Court may review both the facts and the law. Nonetheless, on 
appeal after trial, the court wil 1 generally de fer to the trial 
-23-
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court's findings. BLT Investment Co. v. Snow, No. 15593 . 
I fit: 
October 24, 1978; Foster v. Blake Heights Corporation, 530 p· 
815 (Utah 1974). This standard has been variously phras~ ~ 
drawing all inferences from the evidence in a light favorable· 
the findings to simply assuming the trial court believed that 
portion of the evidence which supported its findings and susti 
ing the lower court's judgment, if possible, on any legal grou 
applicable from the record. 
Secondly, trial courts are allowed exclusivity in r:: 
on the credibility of witnesses. Child v. Child, 8 Otah 2d~ 
332 P.2d 981 (1958); DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d. 
(1962). Furthermore, as appellants waived cross-examinatioo 
regarding respondents' surveyor's preferred testimony that nei: 
parties' survey, which surveys were radically different, coulc 
said to better describe the property contained in the document 
drafted January 2, 1969, the lower court's findings in accorda: 
with that testimony are unassailable on appeal. Russell M.W 
Co. v. Givan, 7 Utah 2d 380, 325 P.2d 908 (1958). 
Matters beyond the record are not considered, nor ar: 
theories not presented below and raised for the first time on 
appeal. See Point IV, infra; Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 44J,I. 
P.2d 598 (1970). 
B. Appeals From Summary Judgment 
In contrast to the above, in appeals from sumrnary]ui 
ments, largely based on the salutary principle that parties sr: 
· f ences are 
not be summarily denied their day in court, all in er 
drawn in favor of the losing party. As succinctly stated in r 
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·2c1·s1·on the pertinent i·nq11i"ry earlier c;_ ' -
... is whether under any view of the facts the plaintiff 
could recover. It is acknowledged that in the face of a 
motion for dismissal on summary judgment, the plaintiff 1 s 
encitled to have the trial court, and this court on review, 
consider all of the evidence which plaintiff is able to 
cresent and every inference and intendament fairly arising 
~herefrom in the light mcst favorable to him. (Abdulkadir 
v. western Paciffg 1Railroad Co., 7 Utah 2d 53, at 57, 318 ?.2d 139 (1957).-
On appeal from summary judgments, any plausible theory, 
even if raised for the first time, may be considered if fairly set 
forth in the substance of the pleadings and affidavits. Rich v. 
McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976). Similarly, to afffirm summary 
J~gments on appeal, this Court must conclude there is no unresolved 
issue of material fact, the solution of which would be required for 
the verdict as rendered and judgment. National American Life Ins. 
Co. v. Bayou Country Club, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 417, 403 P.2d 26 
11965). Alternatively to that requisite finding, the Supreme 
Court must remand the matter for trial. 
C. Procedural Posture of the Opinion 
An analysis of the Opinion in light of the above is en-
lightening. While summarily reciting the essence of the trici.l 
court's findings, the Opinion fails to indicate that there was no 
evidence to support the same or further delineate where the lower 
court erred in taking or re fusing testimony to support contrary 
conclusions. Instead, the Opinion infers the possibility that 
Petitioners might have idly refused to agree to a final descrip-
tion of properties in bad faith. Once having imagined this equity-
shifting inference, the Opinion then proposes a theory of recovery 
~rt raised in the pleadings, not presented t0 the lower court by 
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consent, nor presented on appeal, part performance. Ul tirnat; 
the Opinion remands the case, instructing the trial 
court tc 
testimony as to what the parties did and said. This has a:n 
occurred, and all litigants rested. 
Clearly, Justice Ellett did not, when draftir.g thi: 
Opinion, have the trial transcript before him. Instead her.. 
that appellants, having been denied their day in court, sho( 
afforded the same, and thereafter instructed the lower coun 
what legal theory it could grant specific performance. This· 
should not knowingly compound that initial and inadvertent e:: 
by refusing to rehear this matter. 
POINT III 
THE SUPREME COURT COMMITTED A MANIFEST ERROR 
OF LAW IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF PART PER-
FORMANCE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
A. The Doctrine of Part Performance does not take 
"matters" out of the Statute of Frauds. 
Utah has long recognized the doctrine of part per12:· 
mance. Its application, however, has been used only in ac:cr:.i 
with the principle that as a prerequisite to its invocation,: 
contract between the parties must first be shown. For exarnp;:i 
Adams v. Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P. 465 (1915), the defendar.: 
resisting ejectment, produced the following agreement in writ; 
October 19, 1907. Received of H. W. Mannina $30a5 
payment of 30 acres of land. Price to be $100 for said 1 
D. C. Adams 
The defendant testified at trial that he went into possession 
1907, and had used the land consistent with its only purpose, 
pasturing of animals. The trial court accepted Manning' 
5 ev: 
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and awarded him a. decree of specific performance. The Utah supreme 
court, however, noting that Adams had owned more than 30 acres in 
the vicinity, held that plaintiff's contention that the descrip-
tion contained in the memorandum was insufficient "must prevail". 
Pertinent to the defendant's reliance on part performance, the 
~court stated as follows: 
The first essential, therefore, is to establish that there is 
a contract. Since the receipt referred to is utterly insuf-
ficient to establish a contract, it must be established by 
other competent evidence. Has respondent produced evidence 
by which a parol contract of sale is established with the 
clearness and precision which is required in courts of equity 
where specific performance of parol contracts respecting the 
sale of real estate is sought? All the authorities are to 
the effect that such contracts must be clearly established, 
and we are firmly committed to that doctrine. 148 P. at 466. 
The Adams Court then issued the following caveat regard-
ing the admission of parol evidence to establish contracts otherwise 
violative of the Statute of Frauds: 
[O]nless the courts are very careful in the admission of 
parol evidence and in acting upon the mere inherent proba-
bility as such appear to the courts, they will, in equity, 
enforce parol contracts which are clearly within the statute 
as readily as courts of law enforce all other contracts and 
will thus entirely fritter away the statute of frauds. 
The thrust of Adams clearly is that clear and certain contracts, 
not "matters", are taken out of the statute by part per forrnance. 
The caveat in the Adams case relative to taking parol testimony to 
otherwise establish an uncertain contract has been reduced in 
reference to land descriptions to a rule of evidence in the State 
of Utah. In Davison v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026, 
11973), this Court sta.ted that rule succinctly as fol lows: 
Parol evidence is admissible to apply, not to supply, a 
description of lands in the contract. Parol evidence will 
not be admitted to complete a defective description, or show 
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the in ten ton with which it was made. Parol evidenc 
used for the purpose of identifying the descriptione may 
in the writing with its location on the ground, but C~b 
the purpose of ascertaining and locating the land abnot: 
h t · · d d · out. t e par ies negotiate , an supplying the descriptio h. 
which they have omitted from the writing. There is n t,e: 
distinction between the admission of oral and extrin: c.;. 
evidence for the purpose of identifying the land des/\. 
and applying the description to the property, and tha~h'. 
supplying and adding to the description insufficient an'.·. 
on its face. .c. 
In the instant case, though parol evidence was Ji~ 
introduced over obJ'ection,l.2/ the parol evidence · a receive onl;· 
highlighted the insufficiency of the contractual description,· 
intent to negotiate boundaries, and the continuing disagreeme~· 
the parties. Trial, in fact, revealed 1 i ttle more than the p. 
city of contiguous fences on the ground and that the parties 
vigorously disputed the areas referred to in the contract of 
pu.::chase. 
The fact that appellants in the instant case sporac· 
ically occupied two homes on opposite sides of old U. S. High• 
91 located at Anderson Junction does not aid, as Justice Ellet: 
suggests, a judicial determination of what approximate 10 acr::· 
with those two homes. For, as stated in Adams, possessionmu:·i 
taken ". . . in pursuant of the parol contract proved; that 5':: 
possession was notorious; that it was exclusive and of the~ 
tract of land which was the subject of the contract • n' H: 
P. at 467 (emphasis added). A perhaps clearer statement of~ 
foregoing doctrine is found in Campbell v. Nelson, 102 Utah i:, 
125 P.2d 413 at 415 (1942), wherein the Utah Supreme Court di!' 
entiates acts of part performance from the establishment off 
contract itself as follows: 
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until the parties have agreed as to the terms, there is not 
an enforceable contract in fact, and partial performance 
cannot make up for the deficiency in the understanding 
between the parties. (Id., emphasis added) 
Clearly, as the boundaries were subject to negotiation, 
possession of the homes does not aid in their discovery. 
Again, the threshold question is one of contract, and 
the~ Court's citation to Roberts on Frauds, Section 135, is 
particularly enlightening. 
To call anything a part performance, before the exis-
tence of the thing (the contract) whereof it is said to be 
part performance is established, is an anticipation of proof 
by assumption, and gets rid of the statute by jumping over 
it, for the statute requires proof and prescribes the medium 
of proof. 
As to the standard of proof required for spec i fie performance of 
such contracts, Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 
at 493 (1967) sets the Utah standard: 
The contract must be free from doubt, vagueness, and 
ambiguity, so as to leave nothing to conjecture or to be 
supplied by the court. It must be sufficiently certain and 
definite in its terms to leave no reasonable doubt of the 
specific thing equity is called upon to have performed, and 
it must be sufficiently certain as to its terms so that the 
court may en force it as actually made by the parties. A 
greater degree of certainty is required for specific per-
formance in equity than is necessary to establish a contract 
as the basis of an action at law for damages. 
Part performance, is, thus, not a doctrine without a 
rationally limited appl ica ti on. The Utah Supreme Court has 
accepted the universal principle that only when the parties' minds 
have met and part per forrnance thereafter occurred may their con-
tract be removed from the Statute of Fraud's proscriptions. 
Acceptable evidence pertaining to the tract itself may identify, 
tut not supply, the tract's description. Acts of part performance 
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are not a substitute for the prerequisite meeting of th ~ e mind: 
recent case, Holmaren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 p. 2d 61! 
(Utah 1975), is perhaps the most precise state~ent to a 
ate of: 
doctrine's breadth and applicability. In a unan· 
, imous opinion 
drafted by Justice Maughan, and with deference to a well r 
- easo: 
note in the Utah Law Review, the Holmgren Court stated as fol!•, 
An analysis of our statute, with its qualifying com· 
pan ion al lowing speci fie performance, in the decisions~' 
this court, most of which, to 1964, are noted in Vol. g', 
1, Utah Law Review, p. 91, give us criteria describing' 
conditions, which must necessarily exist before an oral 
contract for the sale of an interest in land can be enfor:• 
The oral contract and its terms must be clear, de fire 
mutually understood, and established by clear, unequi'loca: 
and definite testimony, or other evidence of the same quai. 
In addition, there must be acts of part performance whicn 
equity are considered sufficient to take the case out of: 
statute of frauds: ( 1) Any improvements must be substant:: 
or valuable, or beneficial. (2) A valuable consideratior .. 
demanded by equity. (3) If there is possession, suchpos:• 
sion must be actual, open, definite, not concurrent with~ 
vendor, but it must be with the consent of the vendor. r: 
Such acts as are relied on must be exclusively referrabJe· 
the contract. 
Justice Maughan' s opinion is no less applicable today, the su:· 
stance thereof no less accurate. As stated in 73 Am.Jur.2d 
"Statute of Frauds" §401: 
Since the doctrine of part performance had its origin i~,, 
equity prior to the statute of frauds, it is not surpn''.';' 
to find that the doctrine can be asserted to secure speci .. 
performance of a contract of which there is no memorandum 
writing, as required by the statute, only wh~r~ .. the ci~~:;: 
stances of the case meet the general prerequ1s1c.es to · i 
table relief. Courts of equity decline to enforce a0~ar:r: agreement for the sale of real estate on the ground Pi• 
performance unless the case is clearly within ~he rec~~~;; 
principles of equity jurisprudence. The doctrine op~amaa' 
if, but only if, the remedy of law by a reco':"ery ofwhich: 
or otherwise is inadequate and the contract is one 
in writing would be enforceable in equity. 
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The contract must be fully made and completed in every 
respect except for the writing required by the statute, in 
order to be enforceable on the ground of part performance. 
The parol agreement relied upon must be certain, definite, 
clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal in its terms, partic-
ularly where the agreement is between parent and child, and 
it must be clearly established by the evidence. The requisite 
of clear and definiteness extends to both the terms and the 
subject matter of the contract. 
In light of the foregoing, it is impossible to reconcile 
the following two excerpts from the Opinion filed by this Court on 
January 9, 19 7 9; one stating a fact, the other, this Court's 
conclusion on appeal: 
During the four years after execution of the document noted 
ante [P-17], the parties attempted to reach agreements about 
the description of the land which was sold to the defendants 
[sic, plaintiffs]. Buyers and sellers each set forth proposed 
legal descriptions, but neither would accept the other's 
designation. 
The taking of possession and the payment of $6,400 towards 
the full price takes the matter out of the statute of frauds. 
B. The trial court, on the basis of overwhelminq 
evidence, specifically found that no agreement, 
oral or otherwise, was ever reached between the 
litigants resolving the boundaries. 
Petitioners ask this Court to re-examine the statement 
of facts recited herein, the testimony of the parties, and the 
exhibits on file as part of the designated supplemental record. 
The lower court, after hearing all of the evidence preferred 
~lative to the determination of boundaries, and the intentions 
and subsequent acts of the parties relative to the January 2nd 
~cument, entered a specific finding which is decisive of the 
applicability of the part performance doctrine. F.ind.ing No. 7 
states as follows: 
"' 
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"" 
The Court finds that Russe 11 Ca 11 made several t · 
each year between January 2, 1969, and the filinrips to 
1 , . h 1 g Of tf aswui t in Marc of 973, and that on several oc . ·· 
, d . d. cas1on, 
noun aries were iscussed, but no subsequent agre · 
h . ement or ot erwise, was ever reached that resolved the b'' 
R. 260. am 1gu· 
On appeal, to dispute that finding, this Court rn~s: 
cl ude that there is no evidence in the record to support it, 
that all reasonable minds would so find. Robertson v. Hutck·. 
560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977). Clearly, no contract can~ ~~1 
the Opinion's language that acts of part performance take "tr., 
matter out of the statute of frauds" is, at best, improvident, 
Further, the Opinion's zeal in reaching a result 00: 
cates the problematic descriptive language with the followino 
commentary: 
It is clear that the Stauffers purchased the two k 
and the land about them within natural boundaries amount~ 
to approximately 10 acres. It is also clear that they;: 
chased all of the land on the south side of the freeway,; 
and except the fenced farm ground amounting to approxiia: 
40 acres, together with 2/Sths of the water rights. !ti 
also clear that the Stauffers purchased one-half of all 1 
the remaining property of Cal 1, which was to be held as 
tenants in common. 
The above simply misstates the January 2nd document's divisic: 
water rights and directional references therein. Furthermore,! 
sufficient natural boundaries are non-existent, even as liberi 
defined by Justice Ellett, the issues of which 10 acres arouiil 
homes as well as which 40 acres to be retained become t~~ 
point of the lawsuit. Even the appellants had some self-serv: 
difficulty with the description. At trial, they asserted thi!' 
1. ttle mor: 40 acres clearly to be retained by the Calls meant 1 
f and on the othe: than a parcel bounded on two sides by a ence 
a sloping ridge comprising approximately 18.3 acres. 
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The parties' minds never met. The boundaries were never 
determined. Part performance as a doctrine is inapplicable. 
POINT IV 
~HE SUPREME COORT'S SUA SPONTE CONSIDERATION OF 
THE DOCTRINE OF PART~RFORMANCE, EVEN WERE THAT 
DOCTRINE APPLICABLE, VIOLATES LONG-STANDING PRECE-
DENT REGARDING JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
Contracts for the sale of interests in land under Sec-
tion 25-5-3 of the Utah Code are void unless there is a writing, 
complete in all its material terms, subscribed to by the vendor. 
Thls statute, commonly known as the Statute of Frauds, is basically 
w~tantive, not procedural. The material terms of such contracts 
~n been variously described. According to Pomeroy, the five 
essential features of a contract for the sale of land are parties, 
subject matter, mutual promises, price, and consideration. Pomeroy, 
Specific Performance of Contracts, §87 (3rd Ed. 1926); see also, 
71 Am.Jur.2d "Specific Performance", §34 (1973). Nonetheless, the 
doctrine of part performance has been commonly used to circumvent 
ilie Statute of Frauds when the courts can otherwise ascertain a 
clear, unambiguous and mutually understood contract between the 
parties. Such a contract, however, must be established by unequi-
vocal and definite testimony. Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Bal 1 ard, 
534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975). 
In the instant case, appellants ~ pled, even through 
Pre-trial, the doctrine of part performance as a bar to petitioners' 
defenses properly before the trial court and framed under the 
Statute of Frauds. The doctrine of part performance was further 
oot tried by consent to the trial court. and insofar as the 
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district judge found that there had never been a meeting , 
o. t· 
minds on one of the essential elements of the contract, the" 
t· 
requisite to the applicability of the doctrine was lackin g, 
appeal, neither counsel raised or discussed the doctri~. :: 
Supreme Court, however, sua sponte, stated as follows: 
The taking of possession and the payment of $6,400 towaf 
the full purchase price takes the matter out of the stat: 
of frauds. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized the princ 
that defenses not properly before the trial court nor referre~ 
in assignments of error could not be raised on appeal, In Re: 
-
Estate, 99 Utah 373, 104 P.2d 210 (1940). Thus, issues, new:, 
proposed after trial, were axiomatically not considered by th:: 
Court.~/ The issue of judical consideration of newly raisec 
defenses, however, normally came as a result of zealous counse. 
raising the same on appeal. Meyer v. Deluke, 23 U.2d 74, 451: 
966 (1969); Davis v. Barrett, 24 U.2d 162, 467 P.2d 603, (191: 
Huber v. Deep Creek Irr. Co., 6 U.2d 15, 305 P.2d 478 (1956): 
North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irr. Co., 118 Utah 60~, 
P.2d 577 (1950). The reasoning and legal function of summar: 
rejecting such defenses was succinctly stated by Justice Crod' 
who, in Wagner v. Olsen, 25 U.2d 366, 370, 482 P.2d 702 (19711 
stated as follows: 
Matters neither raised in the pleadings nor put in issue 
at the trial cannot be considered for the first time.on 
appeal. In Simpson v. General Motors Corporation th15 
court held that a party may not inject a new doctnne 
upon which to predicate liability for the first time on 
appeal. This court stat2d: 
se is 
. Orderly procedure, whose proper pur~o ~~ 
the final settlement of controversy, requires 
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a party must present his entire case and his theory 
or theories of recovery to the trial court; and 
having done so, he cannot thereafter change to some 
oifferent theory and thus attempt to keep in motion 
a ~erry-go-round of litigation. 
rd. at 370, cites omitted. 
An earlier case specifically applied this basic rule of 
appellate advocacy to prevent the assertion of estoppel as a bar 
w ~e assertion of the Statute of Frauds where there had been 
ample opportunity at trial to amend and plead that bar. Collett 
"·Goodrich, 231 P.2d 730 (Utah 1951). Appellants had four years 
---
to plead and argue part performance, but never chose to do so. 
On appeal, Justice Ellett, sua sponte, not only proposed 
the doctrine of part performance as an affirmative defense to the 
Statute of Frauds, but in fact the thrust of the Opinion found 
that the same was disposi tive of the lawsuit! It is incongruous 
~at an independent Supreme Court would not only propose a theory 
of recovery, but without argument thereon, embrace the same as 
controlling, even though not raised by any of the parties to the 
appeal. This anomaly can best be explained by the fact that 
Justice Ellett felt that the trial court had, for whatever reason, 
denied the appellants their day in court, he, having inadvertently 
viewed only that portion of the record indicating that the case 
was decided on motions for summary judgment. Had this case been 
so ?ostured, the Supreme Court could legitimately consider that 
doctrine, if only marginally inferable from the record, to remand 
for triai. Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976). 
The Opinion's final instruction to the trial court to 
take evidence "as to what was said and done" clearly indicates that 
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Justice Ellett inadvertently felt the trial court had pr 
even 
the introduction of such testimony by summarily d · 
eny1ng appe:: 
their day in court. In fact, appellants rested at trial, ans 
their theory of recovery was rejected. 
The novel assertion of part performance on appeal Cc 
as a surprise to petitioners. As this Court summarily reject; 
newly raised defenses after trial, it begs the question thatt· 
Court should not position itself as advocate, both raising a:.' 
ruling on its own affirmative defenses. 
POINT V 
THE OPINION ASSUMED A HYPOTHETICAL CASE, 
PLACED THE PARTIES IN THE HYPOTHETICAL 
SITUATION, AND RULED: JUDICIAL INQUIRY rs 
NOT ILLUMINATED BY POSTULATING WHAT MIGHT 
HAVE HAPPENED UNDER OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Counsel for petitioners has previously addressed th: 
Court pertaining to the anomalous taking of judicial notice o: 
hypothetical situation on appeal. In essence, the Opinioo~ 
structed a paradigm comprised of five fictions: 
( 1) That the parties did not intend further negofa 
tions on the boundaries when contracting on January 2, '.' 
(2) That the "boundaries", whether stone walls on: 
fences, were sufficient to enable a proper judicial deter· 
mination of their nature. 
( 3) That there had been a meetina of the minds on;'. 
contractual terms as to the nature and- extent of those 
boundaries. 
( 4) That the fact that the sellers knew of buyers'. 
sporadic occupation of the homes constituted the formers 
consent to the same. 
(5) That the sellers should not prevail, having::~. 
idly by waiting for the materialization of a "mighty w 
fall". 
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With regard to the above, the trial court, after hearing 
all the testimony preferred by appellants, eliminated as a finding 
~ those fictions posed in points 1, 2, 3 and 5 above. The 
oniy remaining inference not particularly ruled on by the lower 
court is No. 4. Preliminary to this discussion, however, peti-
tioners would again refer the Court to Adams v. Manning, Campbell 
v. Nelson, and Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, noted supra, 
which all hold that peaceful occupation is not a substitute for 
mutual understanding under the part performance doctrine. 
Regarding appellants' intermittent possession of some 
rather loosely-defined areas not co-extensive with those parcels 
appellants claimed below, the Supreme Court made the following two 
statements: 
Sellers were aware of appellants' occupation and possession 
of the land and of their improvements of the houses. 
By refusing to agree on the exact description of the land 
sold and in which plaintiffs were placed in possession, the 
seller could hope for a mightly windfall by selling it at its 
enhanced value to others. 
First, it cannot be gainsaid that the possession by appellants was 
at best sporadic until the suit was filed in early 1973. (R.24,'[4; 
T.217:28-218:3) The above use of the passive voice, however, is 
~rticularly peculiar. A disinterested third party might asscme 
~rt Mr. and Mrs. Call placed the buyers into possession of the 
homes and certain de fined surrounding areas. In reality, the 
Calls reasonably assumed that as Mr. Stauffer was employed in 1969 
in California, the Stau ffers would not be making plans to imll'e-
d lately occupy the property. At trial, Mr. Stauffer offered D-13 
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as his notification to the Calls of his wife's plans 
on leavi: 
California, moving furniture and, in general starting renova'.: 
of the houses. (T.85:2-14) That exhibit, a letter drafted:, 
'· 
ruary 12, 1969, is in the file. A cursory examination of it 
reveals nothing about the Stauffers' intent to split up the fr 
with Mrs. Stauffer moving to Utah and making improveme t n s, I.:! 
[W] e are planning on going up this next Thursday the 20ti 
We plan to be going into the houses and doing a lot of 
looking around 
At trial, Mr. Call recounted his surprise upon disc: 
ing that Mrs. Stauffer had occupied the small house when hev;, 
the property in April 1969 to negotiate the boundaries. (T.l' 
14) Mr. Call further testified that he never expected the Sta. 
to move in until the contract had been finalized. (Id.) Pet:: 
do not contest their discovery of appellants' occupation, and: 
haps even initial indifference regarding the same. After all, 
petitioners also expected that the boundaries would be amicat'. 
settled. But, to equate the petitioners' knowledge with an1 .. 
consent as part of a scheme to fraudulently improve their rea: 
estate, is as logical as ruling that we as members of the Bar 
consent to widespread world hunger, insofar as there are none 
among us who lack knowledge of it, and most could do sornethinc 
about it. 
tr· This Court has repeatedly stated that on appeals · 
plenary trials, its rulings should be confined to matters apF" 
from the record. Further, the trial court is allowed a broad 
latitude due to its advantaged position in weighing the credi· 
h t testimc;· bility of witnesses' testimony and in selecting t a · 
-38-
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h Oces to believe in entering its findings of fact and conclu-c ,O ~ 
sions of law. The Opinion never states that any finding as entered 
was not substantially supported by the record. Instead, the 
Opinion indulges in fiction upon fiction, constructing an imaginary 
matrix or paradigm i;;. which, were this the case, the appellants 
would be allowed to prevail. Judicial inquiry into what could 
happen under other circumstances, however, is best addressed as 
dictum and not as a fulc:::-um to elevate disagreement and ambiguity 
to the status of a contract before the Utah Supreme Court. There 
is no public policy to be served by creating an ad hoc ruling 
without prior precedent based upon a mental paradigm of what the 
facts miaht have been under other circumstances. 
POINT VI 
THE SUPREME COURT OPINION ASSUMES THE EXISTENCE 
OF SUFFICIENT BOUNDARIES, EITHER FENCES OR WALLS, 
AND ASKS THE TRIAL COURT TO DO TP.E IMPOSSIBLE AND 
DELINEATE THEM; NO SUCH FENCES AND WALLS EXIST ON 
THE PROPERTY WITHIN WHICH THE PARCELS MAY BE 
LOCATED. 
The Opinion has instructed the trial court to define 
natural boundaries as stone walls and wire fences, and on that 
~sis with the addition of parol testimony "decide what was the 
l~al description of the land included in the agreement to pur-
chase". The assumption that such walls and fences exist to enable 
the trial court to appropriately make this determination is simply 
~ontrary to both the parol and physical testimony in this case. An 
excerpt from the examination of the appellants' surveyor at sum-
mary judgment is perhaps illuminating: 
Q Could vou tell from the face of this contract, from the 
legal description attached and knowing where those two houses 
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are, could you describe with certainty and as a 
h lana su~,, exactly w at ten acres, collectively, went with " 
houses? those tw 
A No. I think it is impossible to follow natur 1 
aries all the way around both these two houses. T~ bou~' 
some natural boundaries adjacent to those two house:re ar; 
all the way around the property. '~ 
Q So you' re saying that parts could be considered as. 
natural boundary. What is a natural boundary, Mr. Day?' 
A Well, anything that might serve as a property line 1 
a fence or a wall or a road or anything of that nature. · 
Q Are there more than one possibility for natural bou~' 
aries surrounding those houses? ·· 
A There are several different possibilities that estat· 
lishes the boundaries of this property, yes. (R.296 aU 
At trial, some thirteen months later, it isunderstr 
able why the appellants did not cal 1 Gale Day, their surveyor,· 
the stand. Further, the uncontroverted trial testimony of Mar:: 
Mal nor, a licensed surveyor, was similar to that of Mr. Day, ti 
is, that either of two radically different surveys were possfa 
ities under the terms of the contract. In fact, as Mr. Day in'. 
cated earlier, the description can be variously platted due tc: 
paucity· of fences and other natural boundaries on the ground. 
The above becomes abundantly clear upon examination' 
the following four exhibits, which should be readily available 
the Court in the Clerk's office: D-2 and P-18 primarily depict 
manner in which U.S. Highway 91 bifurcates Anderson Junction a: 
separates the smaller house from the large.:-. A fence and ceoe~ 
. . b . t are 111 indicated on the southernmost portion of those exih1 1 5 
Both exhJ... bits clearly shoi' on property owned by Owen Cottam. 
but one of the fences and walls, either by depicting lines wi: 
" ~h! 
small x' s through them or by the designation "rock wall · · 
-40-
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fence not depicted thereon is located on the east side of o. s . 
. hwav 91 and runs basically east to WFO!st, north of where Parcol P,19' • -
4 is depicted on D-2 and P-18. This fence has been platted on No. 
~3 and the area adjacent thereto is easily visualized in an 
photograph, D-93. 
A closer examination of P-18 shows a rather sporadic 
scattering of fences to the west of U.S. Highway 91. Appellants' 
designated parcel 2-A, comprised by parcel 2 and parcel 1 on the 
~st, follows fences, walls or other natural boundaries so rarely 
that it strains credibility to believe that the Court could examine 
that document and find the appellants' version of testimony believ-
able. Clearly, the platted dimensions viewed as solid lines are 
not co-extensive with the few existing fences designated as lines 
crosshatched with small x' s. On the east side of U.S. Highway 91, 
the problem is even more severe, as there are but two fences, 
neither one contiguous and one again not shown on P-18 or D-2. 
Testimony elicited at trial confirmed that all the 
~rties knew the boundaries remained unsettled, subject to nego-
tiation, and that the survey proferred by appellants generally 
failed to follow any natural lines. Further, a surveyor's uncon-
trwerted testimony declared that, being familiar with the land, 
the radically different descriptions as platted on D-3 and P-18 
h~ both possibilities under the January 2, 1969, document. 
Oltimately, P-94, prepared by Mrs. Stauffer, Hlustrates but one 
~~ idea of the possible shapes of the parcels she sought to 
purchase. Her illustration is again visibly different from the 
::1 att · · 
.- ing selected by her surveyor, Mr. Day, in 1972. As the 
-41·-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
surveyors both testified in the record that the determinaticr 
boundaries was impossible, it is incongrous at best to exp 
ect. 
trial court to perform this function. As it stands, therefor: 
the remand not only requires the trial judge to fabricate bou: 
aries which do not exist, but to compel independent minds cbv: 
far apart to agree to those fabrications; the judiciary shouJ,: 
cautious in eliminating the exercise of volition through thee. 
of contractual construction. 
POINT VII 
THE JANUARY 9, 1979, OPINION IN CASE NO. 15468 
INSTRUCTS THE TRIAL COURT TO DO SOMETHING ALREMY 
ACCOMPLISHED, THAT IS, TAKE THE TESTIMONY AS TO 
WHAT WAS SAID AND DONE TO PROVE BOUNDARIES. 
In its penultimate paragraph, the Opinion instructs 
the trial court to take testimony as to what was saiC. and done 
not to discover the truth, but "to decide what was the legal 
description of the land included in the agreement to purchase.' 
Obviously, the Court has inadvertently been denied access to 
the designated transcript. An Appendix attached to this brie'. 
clearly outlines that at plenary trial, the lower court, over· 
objections, received all of the evidence, both documentary an: 
parol, preferred by appellants to prove the descriptioo. 
Even after admitting all of appellants' evidence, 
ti including that objectionable under the parol evidence rule, · 
trier of fact found the substance thereof nebulous, inconsist:: 
and legally inconclusive. On appeal, this Court mistakenlY 1~'· 
· evider that appellants were somehow precluded from introduc1~ 
· · At no pl ace i' n the record 15 preferred to prove descriptions. 
this true. 
as to w;; 
Insofar, therefore, as all the testimony 
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was said and done to prove descriptions was _!="eceived, the nature 
of ~ch further testimony to be taken is clouded on remand. 
Clearly, this confusing instruction is due to Justice El let having 
inadvertently failed to review the transcript. 
The further suggestion of the Opinion, that the trier 
of fact take testimony and then decide the description assumes the 
certainty of that testimony and denies the district judge his pre-
rogative to disbelieve the substance of a witness's statement. See 
Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P.2d 981 (1958). The lower 
court, having taken such testimony, already found the parties never 
~reed on a final description, a matter of long-standing importance 
~~een them. Justice Wilkins' statement in dissent is precisely 
en point: 
This case serves uniquely as an instance of appellate 
insistence that a contract for the sale of real property 
be specifically performed by the Court's supplying the 
description where the contract does not identify and was 
not intended to id en ti fy the property to be sold. 
Beyond the prophetic sagacity of that dissent, the Opinion 
also represents a unique instance in which once the bad faith of 
petitioners had been hypothesized, it suddenly became true for the 
~urt. Thereafter, the petitioners' version of testimony, believed 
by the trial judge, no longer became believable or acceptable to 
the appellate tribunal. On remand, the instruction might as well 
be stated: Do not believe the pei tioners' story in this case. 
b 
POINT VIII 
COURTS OF EQUITY CANNOT COMPEL AGREEMENT WHERE 
NONE EXISTS; THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE EXERCISE CF 
EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OVER A STATE OF MIND. 
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At trial, all of the signers of the January 2 d ocur, 
who were called testified that they understood that the b . 
ounci· 
would have to be settled at a future date in an amicable and 
neighborly fashion. The trial court specifically found that, 
though negotiations ensued, the same were fruitless and the .. 
a,,, 
eation of boundaries was never agreed upon. The Opinion has: 
instructed the trial court to "take testimony as to what was 
1
, 
and done and then decide what was the legal description of~ 
land included in the agreement of purchase." Thereafter, the 
trial judge "should order a conveyance of that land to the 
Stauffers n 
In Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d~': 
(1967), the Utah Supreme Court succinctly stated: 
Specific performance cannot be required unless all b 
of the agreement are clear. The court cannot compel the 
performance of a contract which the parties did not mutua: 
agree upon. Id. at 493, citing Bowman v. Reyburn, 155Co: 
82, 170 P.2d 271 (1946) (emphasis added). 
The Bowman opinion, re £erred to in Pitcher, explainE'. 
the logical and sel £-evident rationale for such a limitation: 
citing Adams v. Henderson, 168 U.S. 573, 18 S.Ct. 178, 42 L.EI 
584 (1897), as follows: 
'Equity,' this court said in Hunt v. Rousmaniere' s Adm'n, 
Pet. 1, 14 L.Ed. 27, 'may compel parties to perform theH 
agreements, when fully entered into, acco:cding to their. 
terms· but it has no power to make agreements for the par.: 
and then cornpe 1 them to execute the same. The former 15
5
: 
legitimate branch of its jurisdiction, and in its exe~~l' 
highly bene ficio.l to society. The latter is. wi thou\~h:er 
authority, and the exercise of it would be highly mi 
in its consequences.' 
Utah courts have also rejected such judicial interve· 
it in( 
tion disguised in the cloaks of egui ty primarily because 
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manipulation of a state of mind, be it deemed the volition, will, 
or free agency of the parties. In Whi tehil 1 v. Lowe, 1 o Utah 419, 
37 p, 589 (1894), for example, the Utah Supreme Court declined to 
enforce a contract for the joint operation of a mine "upon the 
basis to be agreed upon". Id. at 590. More recently, Justice 
Ellett, writing perhaps what is now the lead case, discussed the 
principle in Jensen v. Bouwhuis, 577 P.2d 555 (Utah 1978). 
In Jensen all of the elements to a contract, except an 
important provision for partial releases, had been agreed upon 
~~een the parties. The trial court, nonetheless, granted the 
purchaser speci fie performance. Regarding the partial release 
clause which had been previously left to negotiation, the district 
Judge indicated he would make the agreement, and, should the seller 
still refuse to agree, compensate the buyer. In reversing the 
!~er court, Justice Ellett clarified the legitimate problems of 
equity as follows: 
The courts have never felt that it was their duty to 
write a contract for the parties; and where the matters are 
not clearly set out, courts of equity refuse to grant specific 
performance. 
In the case of Davison v. Robbins, et al., the vendee 
was to select two hundred acres of land from a larger tract 
which was properly described. The vendee sued for specific 
performance and this Court held: 
. . . The issue was whether the description was suffi-
cient so that there was a valid contract which would be 
enforced by specific performance. This court cited 
Scanlon v. Oliver, 42 Minn. 538, 44 N.W. 1031 wherein 
the court explained the relevant distinctions between 
two types of-cases. In one, the contract grants one 
party the exclusive right of selection, and the contract 
thus provides a definite means by whicn the location and 
description of the land may be definitely determined 
without any further agreement of the parties. In the 
other type, the writing provides that the particular 
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piece of property to be conveyed is to be mut 
agreed upon by the parties, i.e., the mode prualJy. 
the location and description of the land is t~v~~ 
agreement of the parties. In the Calder case ~hfutc'. 
concluded that the writing constituted a valid 15 '. 
enforceable contract, since the agreement provi~::. 
the vendee was to select the land within a giv .· 
d h · h en ti· an ~ot ing more ad to be agreed upon betwe~ ~ · 
parties. e 
In the instant ac~ion, the agreement in clear" 
u~ambiguous terms provided that the location a~~ 
tion of the land to be conveyed was subject to the 
future mutual agreement of the parties. This writi•· 
constituted a mere expression of a purpose to make·: 
contract in the future, for the whole matter was co'. 
tingent on further negotiations. The trial court er 
in its con cl us ions that the writing constituted a · 
valid, enforceable contract. 
The trial court ordered the parties to agree ( sometL 
they did not do in the signed document or thereafter), an,: 
case they could not agree within thirty days, the judge 'i: 
make a contract for them which neither had ever thought o' 
making; and if the purchaser did not accept the judge'st 
of the new con tract, he, the purchaser could get the mont 
back which he paid at the time the seller signed t~~u 
Money Receipt, plus interest. No option was given he seJ: 
he is stuck with the judge's idea as to what terms they 
should have agreed upon. 
This Court will not compound the error by ordering speci'.: 
performance. Id. at 558. 
The thrust of Jensen, that courts cannot grant speci: 
performance of contracts wherein important matters remain unse:' 
between the parties, is a fundamental principle of equity juri 
prudence. See also BLT Investment Co. v. Snow, No. 15593, an 
opinion written by Justice Hall and concurred in by all justict 
to the Court. Simply stated, the judiciary may not draft~: 
, t' n c 
parties important provisions explicitly left for negotia 10 · 
thP' 
rewrite their contract under the guise of construction and · 
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Judicially compel their adherence to a contract outside their 
contemplation. As stated in 17 Am.Jur.2d "Contracts", §242: 
courts cannot make for the parties better or more equitable 
agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make, 
or rewrite contracts because they operate harshly or in-
eouitably as to one of the parties, or alter them for the 
b~nefit of one party and to the detriment of the other, or, 
by construction, relieve one of the parties from terms which 
he voluntarily consented to, or impose on him those which he 
did not. 
The Stauffer v. Call Opinion does little more than to 
~ttoduce the district judge as a third party to the contract 
negotiated by the parties, who al 1 expressly understood that the 
boundaries were subject to future agreement. The Opinion' s man-
date that the judge "decide what was the description of the land 
i~luded in the agreement to purchase" loses sight of the lower 
coort's express finding that the parties never agreed on bound-
aries, despite substantial effort. The Opinion, thus, not only 
exceeds the bounds of equity recited in Jensen, but further compels 
~e ~titioners to agree to a judicially imposed selection of 
boundaries. This is the very mischief that equity should rigor-
ously avoid. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants' initial action sought specific performance 
of a real estate contract which all the signers understood left 
boundaries subject to future negotiation. Nonetheless, one of the 
appellants moved to the property knowing the boundaries were not 
settled. Though petitioners accepted payments, they did so with 
the conviction that tht! boundaries would be worked out. Nego-
tiations ensued ar,d were fruitless. The lower court, after plenary 
~tiaJ, found the requisite meeting of the minds on the contract 
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had never taken place. That finding is supported by ~b 
stant_, 
all of the credible physical and parol testimony in the . 
recor: 
Appel 1 an ts conceded that their improvements wer 
e o: 
aid in determining the boundaries; similarly, improvement 
s ace 
panied by payments are no substitute for contractual understar. 
and assent. After plenary trial, the appellants rested, havi: 
had al 1 their testimony pro ferred to prove boundaries receive: 
the trier of fact. Appellants failed to meet their burden a~i 
their theory of recovery was rejected. 
' 
This Court, on appeal, reversed. Taking judicial no:, 
of rising land values, the Opinion's author hypothesized that 
petitioners could have stood idly by, re fusing to bargain in~ 
faith and waiting for a "mighty wind fal 1". Not only were pefr 
tioners not afforded a hearing pertaining to such notice, buL 
substance of the same flies in the face of the record on appea: 
and findings entered by the lower court. 
Having once clothed the petitioners in black wool, t· 
Opinion raised its own affirmative defense to the Statute of 
Frauds, part performance, and despite the legal inapplicabilit' 
that doctrine, found the same di sposi ti ve of the case. The Jc. 
court should, according to the Opinion, take the testimony ofc 
parties and decide the legal description of the conveyance. 1·' 
this has already been unsuccessfully accomplished, the lowercc 
must now simply create a contract for the parties where none 
exists and then compel its enforcement. This caprice is clear: 
beyond the legitimate objectives of equity jurisdiction. 
Ultimately, it becomes clear that the Opinion' 5 aut: 
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'd t due to an inadvertent dishevelment of the records, have a~ no , 
access to the trial transcript. The thrust of the ruling in 
is to afford the appellants their day in court, something 
essence 
~ fult had been sum~arily denied them. This inadvertent mistake 
should not be knowingly compounded on rehearing. 
RESPECTFUL1Y SUBMITTED this ~..fh day of February, 1979. 
~~¥ Attorney for Petitioners 
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Gru'KTIONS Al.'-.'D DISPOSITION THERIDF AT TRU>.L 
Gbjecticn 
To Bishop ' s lmended 1:: ~ 11 
complaint " i-<ep ~ 
To Stau::'fer' s testi.rrony l:'.6 
of Nov. 1968 rreeting 
l:i To Stauffer's testi.rrony 
of Nov. 1968 rreeting 
l:: To Stauffer's testi.rrony 
of telephone ccnver. 
l:ll To Stauffer's testi.rrony 
l:28 To Stauffer's testirrony 
of telephone conver. 
3:24 To Stauffer's testi.'IDny 
of Jan. 2 rreeting 
4:24 To Stauffer's testirrony 
about UREC 
5:25 To Stauffer' s testirrony 
about the 10 acres 
~:9 To Stauffer's testirrony 
about contract 
b:8 To Stauffer' s testirrony 
about house 
~:17 To Stauffer's answer 
about 10 acres 
~: 22 To Bishop's question 
about 10 acres 
l9:5 To Stauffer's a.<swer 
regarding conversation 
~:; T 0 Stauffer's answer 
about !::x:iundaries 
~::2 
Tc Stauffer's ansv:er 
:il::out !::x:iundaries 
Grounds Disposition 
RWr Tiireliness Under advise.'leilt ( 4: 29) 
~IDH Irrelevant; i.rmaterial Denied-can be renewed 
(18:29) 
MDH Parol evidence; vary con- Denied (19:8) 
tract; i=elevant; 
i.rmaterial 
MOH Relevancy; rrateriality overruled (21:4) 
parol evidence rule 
MOH Continuing objection on 
parol evidence rule 
overruled on continuing 
objection; renew if 
appropriate (21:16) 
MOH Foundation Sustained (21:30) 
MOH Parol evidence overruled at this point 
(23:26) 
MOH Docurrent speaks for itself It rray stand (24: 26) 
MOH Parol evidence rule; vary- overruled (25:27) 
ing temis of contract 
t-[)H Parol evidence rule overruled (26:10) 
MOH Identity of house Court restated question 
(27:11) 
MOH Unresponsive 
MOH Leading; asked and 
answered 
It rray stand (28:18) 
Leading but overruled 
(28:25-26) 
t-[)H Unresponsive Court restated question 
(29:7) 
MOH Unresponsive It goes out (30:6) 
t-[)H Parol evidence rule; can't Overruled ( 31: 5) 
alter written contract Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page/ 
Line Objection By Grou.~ds 
31:12 To Bishop's question MOH Leading 
31:24 
31:29 
31:23 
31:27 
34:17 
35:8 
35:12 
36:5 
36:18 
37:24 
38:11 
38:26 
39:25 
48:7 
49:6 
49:19 
50:11 
51:3 
To Bishop's question 
To Bishop's question 
To Stauffer's answer 
about what was said 
To Stauffer's answer 
about conversation 
MOH Foundation 
1-'IDH Asked and answered 
,'1JJH Gnresponsive 
MDH Unresponsive 
To Stauffer's testinony MOH I=elevant; imrraterial 
about conversation 
To Stauffer's testirrony MOH Irrelevant; irnrraterial 
about lease of farm 
To Stauffer's answer 
about conversation 
To Bishop's question 
about Exhibit 18 
To Bishop's question 
about alfalfa crop 
To Bishop's question 
about farm land 
To Stauffer's answer 
about conversation 
To Bishop's question 
about small house 
To Bishop's question 
about large house 
To Stauffer's testinony 
about additions 
To Bishop's question 
about additions 
To Stauffer's answer 
about buildings 
To Stauffer's testirrony 
about boundaries 
MOH Unresponsive 
~[)H Exhibit not in existence 
on January 2, 1969 
MOH Pelevancy; materiality 
MOH Asked and answered 
MOH Unresponsive 
MOH Relevancy and materiality 
to contract 
MOH ReleV"'....ncy and materiality 
MOH Foundation 
MOH Like date identified 
MOH Unresponsive 
MOH No testi.'!Ony about 
boundaries 
, 
Di~~ 
-i Let him f· 
(31:13) -, 
Sustaine::: i 
Overnuea 3 
Question., 
Bishop 1i:~ 
Question"' 
Bishop 11:~\ 
Question"' 
Bishop (J~;; 
Overrule<: . 
Sustained•· 
Alla.ied foq 
pUJ.1XJses ('.d 
Overrule<l 1. , 
I 
Allowed-wit; 
trouble Iii ( 
Question rel 
Bishop (30:: 
Overruled :J 
after disc::o 
counsel (J~•:' 
'":I Overrule.:,, 
sustained? 
sustajned '.:· 
Question r2' 
Bishop 
Answer 'ill~,' 
tine (51:, 
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11;e, Obj~ 
~ 
!:ll To Stauffer's testirrony 
atcut conversation 
i· '7 'fo Bishop' s question 
·~ ~ut conversation 
To Stauffer' s testi.r:nny J:l2 t. 
aJ;out conversa ion 
J:lS To Stauffer's testirrony 
al;out conversation 
By Grounds 
MOH Foundation 
.'IDH Foundation 
11DH Unresponsive 
MOH Unresponsive 
Disposition 
Question restated by 
Bishop (52:16) 
Overruled (52:29) 
Let him start his answe. 
(53:13) 
Court restated question 
(53:19) 
]: 29 To Bishop's request MOH Relevance and rrateriality Overruled (54: 7) 
t..'lat witness mark exhibit 
):1 To Stuaffer ' s testirrony 
atout ferice line 
MOH Identity of fence being 
discussed 
7:11 To publication of Call' s wW Foundation 
depcsition 
i:27 To Hughes' question 
atout R.E. contracts 
WRB Witness not qualified 
to give answer 
GJ into it on c=ss-
examination (55:10) 
Sustained (57:15) 
Overruled (76: 29) 
l 
4:23 To Stauffer's testirrony w'RB Docurrent speaks for itself Overruled (84: 25) 
al::out letter to Call 
02:21 To Bishop's question 
al::out natural boundaries 
j 
03:22 To Stauffer's testirrony 
regarding conversation 
t5:5 To Stauffer' s testirrony 
regarding visit of Call 
1s:l5 To Stauffer's testirrony 
al::out walk with Call 
~9:15 To form of answer by 
Mrs. Stauffer 
lS:l To Stauffer's testirrony 
al:x:iut sale of farm 
l5:13 To Bishop's question 
15:25 T c Bisr,cp' s questioE 
MOH Framing of question 
MOH 
~IDH Object as to form 
MOH Pa=l testirrony to 
change written contract 
MOH Like to have her rrark 
directions take.ri 
MOH Relevancy and rrateriality 
Sustained (102:24) 
It goes out (103:24) 
Overruled (105:7) 
Overruled (108:19) 
No action (109:24) 
(not for.ral objection) 
Overruled (115: 3) 
MOH Relevancy and rrateriality Overruled (115:16) 
MDH Parol evidence rule; overruled (115: 27) 
statute of frauds 
li:~O T ? Stauffer's testirrony MOH What is parcel l 
or condition of Parcel 1 
Bishop restated questio 
(117:17) 
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'I 
Page/ 
Line 
123:5 
Objection 
To introduction of 
photographs 
By Grounds 
~IDH Relevancy and rrateriali ty 
141:27 To Stauffer's testirrony MOH Hearsay 
about purchase price 
144:25 To Stauffer's testirrony wW Already answered 
about fences 
162:4 To rrore testirrony about WRB Curmllative 
boundaries 
165:13 To rrore testirrony about WRB Asked and answered 
who determined boundary 
174:14 To introduction of 
Exhibit 94 
178:16 To introduction of 
Exhibit 93 
180:12 To Bishop's Arrended 
Complaint & Reply 
WRB Diagram inaccurate and 
and therefore misleading 
WRB Relevancy 
RWI' Tirreliness (objection 
Il\3.de at start of trial) 
195:4 To introduction of WRB Relevancy 
Exhibit 93 (178:16) 
200:9 To Hughes' question wW Repetitious 
on f ann land 
205:16 To Thompson's questions WRB Cross-examining witness 
about contract 
205:27 To Thompson's questions WRB Repetitious 
about contract 
215:11 To Thompson's question WRB 
about deposition 
216:1 To Thompson's question WRB Repetitious 
about deposition 
221:14 To Stauffer's testirrony RWI' Irrelevant, irrmaterial 
about residence in 1973 
~25:15 To Call's testirrony 
about conversation 
226:20 To Call's testirrony 
about conversation 
WRB Unresponsive 
V.W l.Jnresponsi ve 
~ 
Sustained 
Can rrak.e? 
OverruJ.E:d 
Overruled 
Sustained 
The answer 
(165:17) 
Overruled, 
and misle4 
Court rec 
ruling 
Bishop wit 
to arrend. 
to grant o 
(180 :12) 
Overruled 
Sustained 
Overruled 
Overruled 
Overruled 
Overruled 
It nay st< 
It is stri 
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age/ 
~ 
28:3 
~8:10 
:Jl:ll 
:Jl:l7 
,:J4:2 
p4:18 
:35:14 
' 
136:23 
3 
'b9:7 
145:1 
145:22 
148:14 
150:18 
~53:12 
~156:5 
:~4:4 
•164:16 
!~~7:20 
~ction §L Grounds 
To Thompson' s question WRB Leading 
atout rreeting 
To call' s testirrony WRB Unresp:msi ve 
atout rreeting 
TO ca.ll' s testirrDny WRB Stating oonclusions 
atout rreeting 
To Thompson's question WRB Leading 
atout neeting 
To Call' s testi.'TOny wW Conclusion 
atout contract 
TO Call' s testirrony ww Who said what 
atout conversation 
TO Call' s testirrony l\IRB Wants to know what they 
atout conversation asked 
To Call ' s testirrony WRB 
atout farm ground 
TO Thornpscn' s question WRB Leading 
atout boundary 
To Thornpscn' s question WRB Leading and foundation 
atout f"nn ground 
To Thornpson' s question WRB Foundation 
atout farm ground 
To Thornpson' s question l\IRB Leadi...-1g 
al:x:Jut farm fence 
To Thompson' s question WRB Conclusion 
al:x:Jut agreerrent on farm 
To Thompson' s question WRB Repetitious 
al:x:Jut boundaries 
To Bishop' s question 
al:x:Jut residents 
RWI' I=elevant; imraterial 
To Bishop's ouestion RWI' Wants to know when this 
al:x:Jut agre~nt discussion occurred 
To Bishop's question RWI' After ti.Te lawsuit filed 
al::out agreerrent 8/15/73 
To Bishop's question RWI' Irreleva.'lt; imro.terial 
'il:Dut sale to Sunset Corp. 
Disp:>sition 
Sustained (228:4) 
Court restated question 
(228:14) 
Sustained (228:13) 
overruled (231:19) 
Stricken (234: 3) 
It rriay stand (234:20) 
Question restated by 
Thompson (235:17) 
Question restated by 
Thompson (236:25) 
Sustained (239:8) 
Sustained (245:4) 
Sustained (246:23) 
overruled (248:22) 
overruled (250:19) 
OVerruled (253:14) 
overruled on cross 
(256:8) 
Answer rray stand 
(264:8) 
overruled (264:18) 
Overruled (267:22) 
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Page/ 
Line Objection 
268:17 To Call's testirrony 
al:out Sunset Corp. sale 
269:22 To Bishop's question 
al:out future tenefit 
284:30 To introduction of any 
evidence of Esplin 
on rresne :::-ents 
By Grounds 
RWI' Foundation 
WRB Not in pleadings 
Disr.r 
~ 
AlloWed::: 
Bishop :es· 
(269 :29) ' 
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FOOTNOTES 
1/ Child v. Child, 8 u. 2d 261, 268, 332 P.2d '.181 (1958). 
2/ Finding of Fact No. 4, R. 259. 
3/ Finding of Fact No. 7' R. 259. 
4/ Finding of Fact No. 9' R. 260. 
5/ Finding of Fact No. 13, R. 261. 
6/ That this might occur at least on one case when over 600 
appeals are filed yearly is to be expected. 
7/ Finding of Fact No. 13, R. 261. 
8/ Finding of Fact No. 7' R. 260. 
9/ See Justice Hall's opinion in Hidden Meadows Development 
Company v. Dee Mills, et al., at p. 3, Nos. 15027, 15157, 15188, 
filed January 2, 1979. 
_!_QI See Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 U.2d 61 at 63, 362 P.2d 427 
( 1961) where in the Utah Supreme Court succinctly stated: 
A condition precedent to the enforcement of any contract 
is that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties, 
which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, 
with sufficient definiteness to be enforced. Under the 
circumstances shown to exist here, where there was simply 
some nebulous notion in the air that a contract might be 
entered into in the future, the court cannot fabricate 
the kind of a contract the parties ought to have made and 
enforce it. 
See also Adams v. Henderson, 168 U.S. 573, 18 S.Ct. 179, 42 L.Ed. 
584 (1897); and 17 Am.Jur.2d "Contracts" §18. 
11.I Defendants-respondents' Exhibits 15 and 93 are aerial 
photographs of the property, while the plat map marked as Plain-
tiffs' Exhibit 19 represents the Calls' total ownership in graphic 
form. 
g; 
The Court finds that Russell Call made several trips to 
Utah each year between January 2, 1969, and the filing of this . 
lawsuit in March of 1973 and that on several occasions boundaries 
wer d · ' · e iscussed but ~o subsequent agreement, oral or otherwise, was 
ever reached that resolved the ambiguities. Finding of Fact No. 7. 
13./ 
See Davison"· ~obbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973) 
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1.il Petitioners are not unmindful that "tenor" has 
legal de fini ti on. In the evidentiary scheme, however, t~e': 
of the word comports with its more conmonly accepted meamr.: 
1:.21 E. Wayne Thode, "The Indefensible Use of the Hypot· 
Case to Determine Cause in Fact," 146 Texas Law Review 42], 
1 6 / See also, Carr v. Bradshaw Chevrolet Co., 23 Utah· 
464 P.2d 580 (1970); and Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah2c' 
431 P.2d 126 (1967). . 
121 See Appendix. 
18/ Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 29 Utah 2d 259, soi 
538 ( 1973); State, by and through Road Commission, v. Larki:. 
Utah 2d 395, 495 P.2d 817 (1972); Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utaiii 
482 p. 2d 702 ( 1970); In Re Ekker Is Estate' 19 Utah 2nd rn,' 
485 (1967); Riter v. Cayias, 19 Utah 2d 358, 431P.2d788('. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFIC~TE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on the ~./-/, day of February, 
1979 , I caused the foregoing BRIEF FOR PETITION ON REHEARING to be 
served upon \Hllard R. Bishop, Esq., counsel for appellants, by 
having two copies thereof delivered to his office at 172 North 
Main street, Cedar City, Utah 84720. 
M~¥ 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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